



# Application Security Design Antipatterns

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# What is an antipattern?

- Commonly-used solution that has more bad consequence than good ones
- Another effective solution exists

# What are the dangers of implicit use of antipatterns?

- Vulnerability susceptibility
- Difficult to Retrofit



# Antipattern #1: Excessive Trust



# Excessive Trust

Trust is based on a weak factor



# Excessive Trust


## Reasons

- Easy to implement at small scale
- Integration with legacy systems


## Consequences

- Compromising one component gives access to others
- Hard to investigate full compromising chain

# Example #1: Internal Network Trust




# Example #1: Internal Network Trust







# Example #2: Insufficient Access Control



# Example #2: Insufficient Access Control



# Example #3: UserID in interservice requests and batch processing





# How to detect

- For each connection in the data flow diagram:  
How does one component authenticate another?

# How to avoid

- Zero Trust Principle



# Antipattern #2: Unlimited Blast Radius





# Unlimited blast radius

Lack of strict boundaries  
between components

# Unlimited blast radius

## Reasons

- Fast growing service
- Monolith's legacy

## Consequences


- Compromising one component compromise others
- Hidden dependencies

# Example #1: Monolith

User Management	Business Logic	Media Conventor
File Downloader	Background Tasks	Dynamic Configuration
External S2S API	UGC management	Payments



# Example #2: Cloud account overcrowding



# Example #3: Shared secrets



Service A



Service B



Service C

# How to detect

- What happens if some components are compromised?



# How to avoid

- Separation & Isolation

# Antipattern #3: Insecure by default





# Insecure by default

The contract offers non-secure defaults or makes unclear assumptions about the calling code. The consumer has to make efforts for secure usage.

# Insecure by default

## Reasons


- Provide "easy" way to request/call for all cases via hidden complexity

## Consequences

- Prone to vulnerabilities



# Example #1: Direct Internet Access



# Example #2: "Allow by default" policy

```
@role(MODERATOR)
int moderatorHandler() {}
@role(ADMIN)
void adminHandler() {}
// ???
void anotherHandler() {}
```

# Example #3: Confusion naming

`dangerouslySetInnerHTML =`
VS
`el.innerHTML = data;`  
`{{__html: data}}`

# Example #4: Implicit features

```
SAXParserFactory factory = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
// to be compliant, completely disable DOCTYPE declaration:
factory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctyp
e-decl", true);
```



# How to detect

- What assumptions do we have about data, caller code, etc.?

# How to avoid

- Defaults should be safe for use
- Explicit is better than implicit
- Deny by default



# Antipattern #4: Security by obscurity



# Security by obscurity

Security is based on fact  
that attacker doesn't know  
implementation details



# Security by obscurity

## Reasons

- Lack of full knowledge about platform


## Consequences

- Reverse engineering can find way to bypass security controls

# Example #1: Client side controls



# Example #2: Using WAF instead of real patching



# How to detect

- Check trust boundaries



# How to avoid

- Always implement controls on server side

# Antipattern #5: Uncontrolled access





# Uncontrolled access

Lack of sufficient control  
over access to important  
data

# Uncontrolled access


## Reasons

- Lack of control and inventory

## Consequences


- Inconsistent access control

# Example #1: Uncontrolled 3d-party access





# Example #2: Multiple Authorization Points



# How to detect

- Is there any other way to access data?
- What should we do to change the access policy?

# How to avoid

- Enforce access control policy in one place
- Inventory of all access points



# Antipattern #6: Incidental complexity





# Incidental complexity

Solution that is hard to verify  
from security perspective.  
Solution can be simplified

# Incidental complexity


## Reasons

- Too customizable

## Consequences

- Vulnerabilities in "hidden" functionality

# Example #1: Java deserialization



# How to detect

- Can we simplify the functionality?



# How to avoid

- Keep It Simple Stupid (KISS)



# Antipattern #7: Reinventing the wheel



# Reinventing the wheel

Re-implementing the same solution over and over again for different services



# Reinventing the wheel


## Reasons

- Lack of customisation for a centralized solution

## Consequences

- Difficulty of scaling centralized solutions
- The same problems occur in different implementations

# Example #1: Custom Auth for each service





# How to detect

- Do we already have a solution to this problem?
- Do we solve similar problems over and over again?
- Can custom functionality be more efficient if it's a centralized solution?

# How to avoid

- Use a centrally approved solution

# Strategies for working with antipatterns

- Developer awareness
- Questions during a threat modeling session



# Conclusion

- Antipatterns have a long-term impact on security
- The implicit use of an antipattern can create additional security problems





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<https://github.com/tank1st99/appsec-antipatterns>